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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §78-11-10 DOES NOT
REQUIRE THE FILING OF A BOND IN ANY ACTION
BROUGHT l\Gl\INST AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAPPENS
TO BE A POLICE OFFICER.
Respondent argues that defendants were acting as
police officers at the time of the incident in question, therefore, ipso facto, a bond is required under U.C.A. §78-11-10,
if they are sued.

Defendants' position is precisely that

position argued by the defendants in Wright v. Lee, 104 Utah
90, 138 P.2d 246

(1943)

(as explained in appellant's Brief,

Wright v. Lee, 101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132 (1941) went to the
Supreme Court of Utah a second time and is hereinafter
referred to as Wright II).

Wright II soundly rejected

defendants' argument, using the following rationale expressed
by Justice Wade:
Plaintiff concedes that the defendants
were officers charged with the enforcement of the criminal laws ...

The defendants' evidence merely shows
that they were police officers, and as such
were instructed by their superior to make
an investigation of the plaintiff, in connection with the writing of certain letters and
with certain robberies, and that they made
the arrest.
They further testified that all
the acts, alleged in the complaint, which
they did, were done pursuant to and in the
course of such performance of their duty
as such officers. The testimony on the matters
stated in the last sentence were the bald con-
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clusions of the witnesses, and no facts or
circumstances in support thereof were given ...
The mere fact that they were officers and ~ere
instructed to make an investigation of the
plaintiff does not prove that the acts that
they did were done in the course of the pe~
formance of their duty, nor does it prove that
their acts arose out of the performance thereof.
Nor is this shown by the conclusion to that
effect.
Such testimony may be admissible to sho•,;
the purpose of the witnesses in corrunitting the
acts, still that question must be ultimatelv
determined by the court from all the facts ~nd
circu~stances surrounding the corrunission of the
acts in questions.
(Emphasis added) .
Wright v. Lee, supra, at 249.
In the instant case, the defendants submitted
Affidavits purporting to show that at the time of the incident, they were acting in their capacity as police officerc.
These are self serving statements no different than
made by the defendants in Wright II.

thos~

The trial judge, •J11Jer

the holding of Wrighi.:___!!, cannot require that plaintiff
post a bond merely because the defendants are police officers.
Rather, the Wright cases require that a hearing be held to
determine whether the officers were acting outside the
of their authority.

sco~

If so, no bonu is required of a plainti'.:.

In the instant case a hearing was never held to
determine whether the defendants, even though they were e~~~
as police officers by Ogden City, were acting within
scope of their duties and authority.

ti~

Llecause of the brutal

nature of the assault on plaintiff, the evidence rtoes tend
to support the allegation that the defenuants were not a·~tinc
within the scope of their duties ciml aullrnrit/.
in the Wright cases require th0r

t Ile

ti·iLil court !1Li·:c "
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on this matter, and plaintiff need not post a bond.
The respondents also contend that the hearing
afforded the plaintiff by the holdings in the Wright
cases, will require a fullfledged trial and thus frustrate
the bond statue.

This conclusion is not borne out

by a careful reading of those cases.

Rather, they

require a pretrial hearing by the the trial judge
as to this matter, with the trial judge furnishing findings
of fact to support his decision.
POINT II

THE BOND SHOULD BE WAIVED SINCE APPELLANT
PROCEEDED IN FORMA PAUPERIS BY FILING AN
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY AND REQUESTING
THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE TO WAIVE THE BOND.
The trial record includes a copy of plaintiff's
Affidavit of Impecuniosity.

On page 10 of the transcript's

Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiff's attorney described plaintiff's poor economic state and requested that the judge waive the
bond.

On the transcript's same page, plaintiff's attorney

argues that under the circumstances, before the court, a
bond need not be filed.

Plaintiff's attorney further states

that if the judge differs with plaintiff's position, the
judge has the discretion to set the bond and plaintiff would
request that no amount be set by the court so that the
plaintiff could have his day in court.
The question as to whether a bond should be required
of an impecunious plaintiff is a novel one in the State of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Utah as is the question of the constitutionality of requitinc
a bond in all instances.

In the interest of judicial

E:cono~,,·,

the plaintiff respectfully urges this Court to address the
question now.
In the past, this Court has intimated that a
constitutional issue need not be raised at the trial court
level in every instance in order to be considered on appeal.
In State v. Sheldon, 545 P.2d 513 (Ut. 1976), the Court declined to consider a constitutional issue on appeal, since
the transcript of the record did not reveal that the issue
had been raised at the trial level.

In a long dissent,

Justice Maughan, relying in part on In Re Clark's Estate,
argued that the Court should consider constitutional issues
raised for the first time on appeal.

Justice Maughan noted

that the ordinance in question appeared on its face to raise
a question of voidness for vagueness, a point especially
pertinent in view of the constitutional question appellant
is raising here.
Justice Maughan' s dissent relies in part on Article
8, Section 9, Utah State Constitution, which provides that:
From all final judgments of the district
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The appeal shall be upon
the record made in the court below and under
such regulations as may be provided by law.
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions
of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal
shall be on questions of law alone. Appeals
shall also lie from the final orders and decrees
of the Court in the administration of decedent
estates, and in cases of guardianship, as shall
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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be provided by law.
Appeals shall also lie
from the final judgment of Justices of the
peace in civil and criminal cases to the District
Courts on both questions of law and fact, with
such limitations and restrictions as shall be
provided by law; and the decision of the
District Courts on such appeals shall be final,
except in cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a statute.
Justice Maughan further states in Sheldon:
"The Constitution does not say that the constitutional issue must first be raised in the
court below.
It simply, and forthrightly provides jurisdiction for this court to consider
the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance,
when it appears that such is involved." Id. at
515-6.
l\ppellant contends that if U.C.A. §78-11-10 (1977)
requires a bond to be posted, regardless of the financial
plight of an impecunious plaintiff, then such a requirement
is void on its face as violative of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution as
pointed out in the discussion of Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S.

371

(1971).

The case of In Re Clark's Estate, 74 P.2d 401
(Cited by Justice Haughan in

Sheld~i:i_),

(1937),

held that a constitutional

question decisive of an appeal by the state on an inheritance
tax matter could be considered even though the constitutional
issue was first raised by the Court itself on appeal.

The

Court reached this decision despite the fact that, in its
words, "the constitutional question h'as neither suggested,
briefed or argued in the case pr"-or to its decision." Id. at 405.
Because of the importance of the Constitutional
issue raised here, plaintiff-appellant urges this Court to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT 1 II
RESPONDENT'S RELIANCE ON UNITED STATES v. KPJ\S
IS MISPLACED, BECAUSE KRAS INVOLVED A. BANKRUP'fey
CASE AND NOT A CIVIL SUIT FOR REDRESS FOR PEPSon~.l
INJURY.
Plaintiff wishes to point out that the circu1"stJriCE:
here are different than those in the case of United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S.

434

(1973).

K1·,1s is o. bankruptcy case.

It differs from this case in that there are means other than
a judicial proceeding for a debtor to obtain relief from his
creditors.
"Nor is the Government's control over the
the establishment, enforcement, or dissolution of debts nearly so exclusive as Connecticut's
control over the marriage relationship in
Boddie.
In contrast with divorce, bankruptcy
is not the only method available to a debtor
for the adjustment of his legal relationship
with his creditors ....
However unrealistic the remedy may be in
a particular situation, a debtor, in theory,
and after in actuality, majy adjust his debts
by negotiated agreement with his creditors.
At times the happy passage of the applicable
limitation period, or other acceptable creditor
arrangement, will provide the answer.
Government's
role with respect to the private commercial
relationship is qualitatively and quantitatively
different from its role in the establishment,
enforcement, and dissolution of marriage.
Resort to the court, therefore, is not Kras'
sole path to relief.
Baddie's emphasis on
exclusively finds no counterpart in the bankrupt's situation."
Id. at 445-6.
Plaintiff contends that redress for injuries because
of a tort committed upon one's person lies solely in
at law.

0n

actir·'·,

Self-help has long since been denied injured parties

because it w6uld tend to cause a breach of the peace.

s i nee

plaintiff's only remedy is an actinn at lav1, to deny an imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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I
I

I
I

_l

pccunious plaintiff his day in court would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as pointed out in
Boddie v. Connecticut (supra).

There the Court said:

"Thus, although they assert here due process
rights as would-be plaintiff, we think appellants'
plight, because resort to the state courts is the
only avenue to dissolution of their marriages, is
akin to that of defendants faced with exclusion
from the only forum effectively empowered to settle
their disputes.
Resort to the judicial process
by these plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a
realistic sense than that of the defendant called
upon to defend his interests in Court.
For both
groups this process is not only the paramount
dispute settlement technique, but, in fact, the
only available one."
(Emphasis added).
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 372, 376-77. (1970)
In the recent case of Lecates v. Justice of the
Peace Court No.
898

4 of the State of Delaware, et. al.,

637 F.2d

(3rd Cir. 1980), the Circuit Court addressed the issue of

whether the Boddie holding applies to a civil case (other than
divorce)

and concluded than it docs.
In the Lecates case, appellant, Richard Lecates,

had had a trial before a justice of the peace regarding whether
the repossession of his automobile and the resale were in
violation of the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Justice of the

Peace, who was not trained in law, ruled against Mr. Lecates.
In Delaware, an unsuccessful party in a justice of the peace
court is entitled to a trial de novo in Superior Court, but
a losing defendant must first post a surety bond to obtain such
a trial.

The bond was nonwaivable even for indigent plaintiffs.
The Circuit Court went on to hold that the nonwaivable

bond in a civil case such as this violated Lecates' Due Process
rights.

On pp. 18-19 the Court stc1tes:
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Boddie directly supports the proposition that
an ind_igent civil defendant such as Lecates has a
right 6f equal recourse to the complete range of
the trial machinery by which the state declares
legal rights and imposes leyal obligations. Although the Supreme Court in Boddie was concerned
with establishing a right of initial access for
a plaintiff, Justice Harlan supported the Court's
holding that a state cannot erect financial barriers
to access to state-controlled divorce proceedings
by analogizing the position of a person seeking a
divorce to that of a civil defendant.
Both are at
the mercy of the government, which holds exclusive
dominion over the means to secure or protect the
respective legal rights and interests.
Both the
person desiring a divorce and a defendant involuntarily hauled into court have no realistic alterna- I
tive but to pursue the judicial processes established I
by the sovereign.
As Justice Harlan observed, the
"successful invocation of this governmental power
'
[the court system] by plaintiffs has often created
serious problems for defendants' rights.
For
at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes
the only effective means of resolving the dispute
at hand and denial of a defendant's full access
to that process raises grave problems for its
legitimacy."
401 U.S. 371.
This wisdom would
seem to be applicable to Lecates' plight.
The Court on pp. 20-21 rejected the argument that Boddie appii9'\
only to a marriage-divorce situation and, rather, concludedtro:I
I
it applies to civil cases in general.
The reasoning displayed in Justice Harlan's
extensive discussion in Boddie of the rights of
defendants therefore remains viable because as he
recognized, the judicial system is the exclusive
peaceful means by which a defendant may protect
his rights and interests.
Thus, the central wisdom of Boddie informs
our resolution of the present case:
"Due process
requires, at a minimum that absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right
and duty through the judidical process must be
given a meaningful opportunity to be heard."
401 U.S. at 377.
-8Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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As in Delaware, the Utah Constitution also guarantees
a right to trial for "any civil cause", as was pointed out in
appellant's brief.
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for
an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party.
The mandated access is, for it speaks of "an injury done to
him in his person, property, or reputation."
is especially instructive:

The last clause

"no person shall be barred from

prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in the State, ...
any civil cause to which he is a party."

To foreclose plain-

tiff from bringing his civil action for personal injuries done
to his person would conflict with Section 11 of Article I, Utah
Constitution.

Thus, it can be seen, that the right to a trial

for redress for a personal injury is an inalienable right under
the State Constitution and should not be denied a plaintiff
merely because he is unable to pay for a bond as required by
U.C.A.

§78-11-10.
In conclusion, appellant urges this Court to recognize

the mandate set out by Boddie and to hold that the bond requirement of U.C.A. §78-11-10 is unconstitutional, unless there is
allowance for its waiver in the case of an indigent plaintiff.
DATED this

1981.
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